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RECENT CASES
Attachment Execution-Garnishment of Choses in ActionPlaintiff entered judgment on a note given him by the defendant and issued
attachment execution against the X Bank and defendant individually and
as executor of his father's estate. Defendant owed the Bank a debt secured
by notes and mortgages belonging to the defendant and by an assignment of
defendant's interest in his father's estate. Held, that the attachment
against the notes and mortgages is ineffective since the obligors on these
choses were not made garnishees. However, the defendant's equity of
redemption in the pledged interest in his father's estate is subject to attachment.

Seip v. Laubach, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Jan. 25, 1939, P. I,

col. 6 (Pa. 1938).
The instant case is indicative of the need for legislative reform in
Pennsylvania so that a chose in action itself may be reached by garnishment proceedings.' Under the present rule, the chose is treated merely
as evidence of the debt, and the obligor on it must be garnished since he
is the party indebted to the defendant. 2 Such a requirement seems rather
undesirable where, as in the instant case, the plaintiff is prevented from
reaching pledged assets of his debtor simply because these assets happen
to be choses in action and the plaintiff has garnished the pledgee rather
than the obligor on the choses. So long as the chose in action is itself
within the jurisdiction of the court 8 and may be taken by the sheriff in
pursuance of a ft. fa., the need for joining the obligor on the chose in the
garnishment proceedings is difficult to perceive. The latter must meet
his obligation, and it is probably immaterial to him whom he pays provided the note is surrendered to him. In view of this, the court could
well consider the chose as the debt itself and thus within the purview of
the garnishment statute as a debt due the defendant. 4 Plaintiff in the
instant case attempted to circumvent the Pennsylvania rule by claiming
that he was seeking to attach the defendant's interest as pledgor of the
pledged security, i. e., the equity of redemption, and not the debt due from
the obligor on the chose. While the court was logically consistent in
rejecting the argument and requiring joinder of the obligor,5 this illusI. For a definition of garnishment see 2 SHINN, ATrAcHMENT AND GARNISHMENT

(1896) §465.

The present Pennsylvania statute provides for "a debt due the defendant, or
a deposit of money made by him, or goods or chattels pawned, pledged, or demised".
PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, ig3)

tit. 12, § 2265.

Cf. the Illinois statute which directly

provides that a chose in action may be reached by garnishment proceedings against the
person holding it. CAHILL, ILL. REVIsED STATUTES (1931) c. 62, § 5.

ham v. Doolittle, 14 Neb. 214, 15 N. W. 6o6 (1883).

See also Burn-

For a very complete statute see

S. D. REv.CoDE (igig) §2453 and §2470.

2. Gilmore v. Carnahan, 81* Pa. 217 (1874) ; Taylor v. Huey, 166 Pa. 518, 3 Atl.
igg (I895) ; Adkins v. Poth, 286 Pa. 555, 134 Atl. 444 (1926). Cf. Steward v. McMinn,
5 W. & S. ioo (Pa. 1842). This seems to be the general rule. See RooD, ATTACHMENT, GARNISHMENTS, JUDGMENTS AND ExECUTIONS (Igo') § I70; 2 SHINN, ATTAcH-

MENT AND GARNISHMENT (1896) § 477.

3. Power over the garnishee would give the court sufficient jurisdiction. This is
sufficient in the case of tangible property and there seems to be no valid reason why
this should not be extended to apply to choses in action. See Carpenter, Jurisdiction
Over Debts (917) 3 HARv. L. REv. at gog. See also Newman and Kaufmant, The
New York Garnishee Execution as a PracticalRemedy (1934) 12 N. Y. L. Q. 255.
4. See supra note i.
5. Cf. Burnham v. Doolittle, 14 Neb. 214, i5 N. W. 6o6 (1883)

where, under a

statute providing that "rights and credits" of the defendant could be garnished, the
(867)
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trates another bad feature of the rule. The pledgor's equity of redemption
becomes valuable if the pledgee sells the pledge and, after applying the
proceeds to his debt, has a surplus which must be returned to the pledgor.6
How can attachment issued against the obligor on the chose in action
possibly affect this surplus? The equity of redemption also becomes
valuable if the debt is paid and the pledge returned to the pledgor.7 In
that situation if the pledge is a mortgage and the garnishor's attachment
is recorded, then an attachment against the mortgagor warning him to
pay the mortgage debts to the garnishor becomes valuable. But if the
chose is a negotiable note the pledgee upon regaining it may immediately
negotiate it, and an attachment against the obligor would seem to be of
no avail as against a bona-fide purchaser of the note. Thus it would seem
that the easiest way to avoid complications would be to allow the plaintiff
to garnish his debtor-pledgor's equity of redemption in the pledge,8 giving
him a judgment conditioned on the existence of a surplus remaining after
foreclosure and sale by the pledgee or payment of the debt so as to entitle
the pledgor to a return of the chose.'

Banks and Banking-Validity of a Repurchase Agreement in Connection with a Sale of Securities by Bank-Defendant bank induced
plaintiff to buy certain unlisted securities of other corporations which the
bank then owned by agreeing to repurchase them at any time at the sale
price. After the 1929 crash, plaintiff demanded that the bank repurchase
and the bank refused. Held, that plaintiff may not recover on the contract because it is against public policy and the bank had no power to make
such an agreement. Rothschild v. Manufacturers Trust Co., i8 N. E.

(2d) 527 (N. Y. Ct. of App. 1939).
In view of the fact that it was admitted that the bank had power to
buy and sell securities, the reasons assigned by the court for the refusal
to enforce the repurchase contract seem open to some question. The basic
objection was that the agreement, unknown to the public and the bank
examiners because it was deliberately omitted as an item on the bank's
books,' was a contingent liability inimical to the stability of a public incourt allowed the garnishment of a pledgor's equity of redemption in two promissory
notes. See also Bank v. Gelhaus, 6o S. D. 31, 242 N. W. 642 (1932). For an excellent
review of the many views on this question see Note (1933) 83 A. L. R. 1383.
6. BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY (1936) c. XV. See particularly § 134, where the
general rule is stated to be that absent an agreement to the contrary the pledgee of
choses in action must enforce his security by collecting the same from the obligor of
the pledged chose. Whether an agreement was present in the instant case does not appear, but if not, and the pledgee forecloses, that seems all the more reason why the
plaintiff should be able to reach this money in the pledgee's hands. An attachment
against the obligor on the chose would be of no effect for he must pay the pledgee
whose rights are superior to the plaintiff's.
7. BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY (1936) c. XV.
8. In a brief filed by amicus curiae in the instant case an argument was made to the
effect that plaintiff could issue a fi. fa. and sell the pledgor's equity of redemption at a
public sale. Quaere as to the value of this equity unless the pledged collateral greatly
exceeded the value of the debt for which it was security.
9. There seems to be no express authority for granting a conditional judgment in this
situation in Pennsylvania, but the instant court had no difficulty in granting one against
the defendant's interest in the pledge of his interest in his father's estate. In reference
to this latter point see DRAKE, ATTAcnMENT (7th ed. i8gi) § 499.
i. N. Y. CoNsoL. LAWs (Cahill, 193o) c. 41, § 304, provides that any onission of
a "material particular pertaining to the business" from any book with intent to deceive
the bank examiner is a felony.
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stitution. 2 It is almost universally conceded, and New York seems to be
no exception,3 that a bank has the power to guarantee commercial paper
which it owns and which it transfers in the regular course of business. 4
Since the securities in question were both stocks and bonds between which
no distinction was made, it must be assumed that the objection of the
court was based fundamentally not on the subject matter, but on the
nature of the transaction. 5 Consequently the important question here involved is whether there is a valid distinction between a guarantee of commercial paper, whether by endorsement or otherwise, and an agreement
to repurchase the same. The difference found by the court was that the
repurchase agreement was an unnecessary, unusual and positively dangerous practice subjecting the bank to a future liability which it had no power
to control and which might arise at any time depending on fluctuating
market conditions and the whim of the purchaser, whereas the endorsement transaction was necessary and usual and the liability thereon did not
arise until default of the maker whose financial responsibility the bank
could ascertain before it sold the paper with its endorsement.8 Other
courts have failed to see the distinction but have considered each transaction as merely a means of saving another harmless and accordingly both
have received like treatment. 7 In accord with this latter view, it is submitted that once the bank has made a poor investment, whether in the
purchase of a note or the acquisition of stock, it is just as necessary and
incidental to the disposal of the stock that it be "guaranteed" by one
means or another as it is in the case of a sale of the note and the liability
which may thereafter accrue is the result, not of the guarantee, but of the
original investment and depends on the prudence exercised in making the
investment. Admitting that a repurchase agreement may be an unwise
practice, it yet has its advantages in that the bank has the use of liquid
assets until the purchaser exercises his option. That this advantage may
be outweighed by the disadvantage of an inability to stop loss upon a
decline in the market should cause the bank to hesitate to enter into the
transaction. Even admitting this to be true the conclusion is not neces2.

Instant case at

529.

3. O'Connor v. Banker's Trust Co., 159 Misc. 920, 289 N. Y. Supp. 252 (1936);
Instant case at 529; N. Y. CONSoL. LAWS (Cahill, 193o) c. 3, § 185.2 (authorizing trust

companies to negotiate notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other evidences of debt).
4. People's Bank v. National Bank, 101 U. S. 181 (1879) ; McDaniel v. Altoona
State Bank, 126 Kan. 719, 271 Pac. 394 (1928); Farmers and Merchants Bank of Elkton v. Wisdom, 226 Ky. 179, 10 S. W. (2d) 846 (z928) ; Farmers and Merchants Bank
v. Mellum, 173 Minn.325, 217 N. W. 381 (1928); Westboro Lumber Co. v. Dibble, 199
Wis. 350, 226 N. W. 313 (1929) ; Dorman v. Hook, 26o Ky. 367, 85 S. W. (2d) 1OO1
(1935) ; Enid Bank & Trust Co. v. Yandell, 176 Okla. SSO, 56 P. (2d) 835 (1936).
S.The court's argument that the liability depended on the fluctuations of the market would apply equally to stocks or bonds. It would also apply, though to a lesser
degree and only indirectly, to promissory notes or other commercial paper. It should
be especially noted that the stocks and bonds in this case were unlisted.
6. Instant case at 529, 530.

7.Awotin v. Atlas Exchange Bank, 295 U. S. 209 (1935) (Repurchase agreement
held bad as a guarantee and hence in violation of federal statute forbidding national
banks to transfer paper except "without recourse". 44 STAT. 1226, 12 U. S. C. A. § 24
(1927)); Dorman v. Hook, 26o Ky. 367, 85 S. W. (2d) 1001 (1935) (Repurchase
agreement held valid as a guarantee) ; Enid Bank & Trust Co. v. Yandell, 176 Okla.
550, 56 P. (2d) 835 (1936) (Repurchase agreement of stocks held valid). See also
the language in Knass v. Madison & Kedzie State Bank, 354 Ill. 554, 562, 188 N. E. 836,
840 (1933), 82 U. OF PA. L. REv.759, 28 ILL. L. REv. 1o92 (1934), declaring that a
repurchase agreement of bonds was tantamount to a guarantee. In this case the agreement was held against public policy but it was stressed that the bank did not own the
bonds at the time of sale.
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sarily that it is against public policy and outside the bank's powers for
that reason. The second reason assigned by the court in rebuttal to plaintiff's contention that the loss was due to the original investment and not
to the contract of repurchase was that the vice of the transaction lay in
the misleading appearance it gave to the financial condition of the bank
in the absence of any notation thereof on the books. 8 But if public policy
demands publicity, it would seem better to charge the officers of the bank
with failure to notify the public and the bank examiner than to assess this

plaintiff for the omission,9 in the absence of any showing that he conspired
with the bank to suppress the information.' 0 If this contract were considered as merely ultra vires the bank, plaintiff might have his remedy on
an implied promise to return benefits conferred. 1 ' But since it is a generally established principle that no relief will be granted where the contract is against public policy,' 2 the result of this case is that the bank has
been allowed not only to pass the risk of loss to the provident purchaser,
but to retain the money advanced by him on the strength of the invalid
agreement.'-

Constitutional Law-Federal Milk Control and the Due Process
Clause-The United States sought to compel defendants to comply
with order of the Secretary of Agriculture issued under the Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act. The order, fixing prices to be paid to milk
producers, exempted co-operatives from the requirement to pay uniform
prices, which resulted in enabling the co-operatives to undersell proprietary
handlers due to the lower price paid by them to their producer-members.
Held, the Act, as applied in this order, violates the Fifth Amendment by
taking the property of proprietary handlers without due process of law,
since the Act unreasonably discriminates in favor of co-operatives. 1 United
States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., 6 U. S. L. Week 861 (N. D.
N. Y. 1939).
8. Instant case at 52o.
9. See supra note i.

io. Mount Vernon Trust Co. v. Bergoff, 272 N. Y. 192, 5 N.E. (2d) 196 (1936), 50
HARv. L. REv. 687 (1937) ; Bay Parkway Nat. Bank v. Shalon, 27o N. Y. 172, 2o0 N.
E. 685 (1936). In these cases liability was imposed on a defendant who had given a
note to the bank without consideration because he was chargeable with knowledge that
the note might be used to conceal the actual condition of the bank.
ii. Appleton v. Citizens Cent. Bank, i9o N. Y. 417, 83 N. E. 470 (i9o8) ; American Surety Co. v. Philippine National Bank, 245 N. Y. 116, 156 N. E. 634 (1927);
State Bank v. Stone, 261 N. Y. 175, 184 N. E. 750 (933) ; FWICHER, CoRpoRATIoxs
(1931) §§ 2598, 2599. The difficulty, of course, in allowing recovery for benefits conferred under invalid contracts of repurchase is that such recovery in effect enforces the
letter of the contract. If the contract were divisible, the amount of recovery might be
limited to the difference between the disposal value of the securities at the time of the
purchase and the price paid. Such a contract, however, is held to be indivisible and the
damages assessed as of the time of tender back under the repurchase agreement. See
Coon v. Smith, 4 F. Supp. 96o (E. D. Ill. 1933).
12. Awotin v. Atlas Exchange Bank, 295 U. S. 209 (1935); WOODWARD, QUAsICONTRACTS (1913) § 161. See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 369.
13. In State Bank v. Stone, 261 N. Y. 175, 184 N. E. 750 (I933), the court held a
pledge by the bank of bonds to secure defendant's deposit was ultra vires but that the
bank, now insolvent, could not recover the bonds without first paying the full amount
of the deposit to defendant.
i. It should be noted that the holding in the instant case was also based on the fact
that the producers' approval of the order was obtained by misrepresentation.
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The instant case represents a new phase in the lengthy struggle to
regulate milk production and marketing, 2 and throws into relief the
peculiar position of the producers' co-operatives. The avowed purpose
of the Marketing Agreement Act is the establishment of orderly marketing
conditions in order to give farm products a purchasing power equivalent
to that which they possessed in the base period, I909-I914.3

The special

problems relating to the milk industry-public health, 4 the perishability
of the product, and co-operative associations -- have necessitated special

legislation as to milk marketing. 6 Yet it is apparent from the facts of the
instant case that these problems have not been solved. In the New York
marketing area the co-operatives occupy a dominant position.7 The development of these co-operatives, with consequent elimination of middlemen's profit, has been praised as one way of raising the farmer's income; 8
since the purpose of farm legislation is the betterment of the farmer's lot
without unreasonable harm to the consumer, the logical step would seem
to be complete elimination of the handler or processor.9 That such is the
tendency of the order in the instant case seems to be the inevitable conclusion from the detailed evidence. 10 Granting that, from the producer's
point of view, such a result is desirable, the legislatures are still confronted
with the problem of the handler or middleman. Outright confiscation of
his business or property is impossible, and the order in the instant case
seems to be little short of that."- It would seem that any governmental
action which gives the co-operatives such a marked advantage in the competitive struggle is arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory in violation
2. Cadwallader, Government and Its Relationship to Price Standards in the Milk
Industry (1938) 22 MINN. L. REv. 789.
The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act and orders under it have been enforced and upheld in two other district courts. United States v. Hood, 6 U. S. L. WEEK
862 (D. Mass. 1939) ; United States v. Kretching, 26 F. Supp. 266 (S. D. Ohio 1939).
However, the question of discrimination in favor of co-operatives does not appear to
have been raised in these two cases, although the exemption of co-operatives from the
duty to pay producer-members the uniform price is incorporated into the Act itself. So
STAT. 246 (1937), 7 U. S. C. A. § 6o8c (5) (f) (Supp. 1938).
3. 50 STAT. 246 (1937), 7 U. S. C. A. § 6o2 (Supp. 1938).

4. The earliest governmental intervention in the milk industry was in connection
with public health, and generally took the form of state rather than federal regulation.
N. Y. Laws (1862) c. 467. See cases collected in Notes (1922) I8 A. L. R. 235, (1926)
42 A. L. R. 556, (1929) 58 A. L. R. 672, (1932) 8o A. L. R. i225, (1936) tot A. L.

R. 64.
It has been urged that price restrictions enacted for the benefit of milk producers
are necessary health measures, because only a fair return for their products will allow
farmers to employ sanitary methods of dairying. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S.
502, 516-517 (934).

5. As to the size and importance of producers' co-operatives see Cadwallader, stpra
note 2, at 8W8.
6. The Agricultural Adjustment Act devoted special attention to the milk industry,
and these special provisions have been incorporated into the Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act. 50 STAT. 246 (i937), 7 U. S. C. A. § 6o8c (5) (Supp. 1938).
7. Opinion instant case, p. 13 (full opinion not yet reported).
8. See FREDEXicxsEN, THtE SToRY OF MiIK (i919) 40-4i, wherein the former utility of the handler is recognized, although the conclusion is reached that he has served
his purpose and is now unnecessary.
9. See Herman, Orderly Marketing in Agriculture (937) 45 J. PoL. Ecol. 394,
wherein the author indicates that the present plight of the farmer is due to the unnecessary profits of the processor, but pays lip-service to the idea that the processor should
be allowed a fair return for his services in efficient distribution.
to. Opinion, instant case, pp. 26-36.
ii. Ibid.
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of the due process clause as applied to matters of substance.1 2 Although
the classification of the co-operative in a category distinct from that of the
ordinary handler may be defended on the ground that the co-operative is
merely the sum total of its individual producer-members, s rather than a
handler or middleman, yet it seems almost inevitable that when such
classification results in virtual confiscation of the handler's business by
giving co-operatives a great competitive advantage, the courts will consider it unreasonable.' 4 The more practical step would seem to be to
legislate as to co-operative and handler on equal terms, and trust that the
ability of the co-operative to undersell the handler in the competitive market will eventually and gradually eliminate what has become, at least in
the dairy industry, an unnecessary and parasitic link in the distribution
and marketing of the farmers' produce.15

Constitutional Law-Validity of Legislation Under Which Restrictions Imposed on the Use of Property May Be Removed by the
Consent of Adjoining Landowners-A statute ' provided that no occupier of coal land should work his mine within five feet of the boundary
line without the consent of every person interested in the adjoining land
in addition to the approval of the Chief of the Department of Mines and
Minerals. 2 Any person injured by a violation of this provision became
entitled to a specified penalty. On suit to recover such penalty, the constitutionality of the statute was contested. Held (one judge dissenting),
recovery allowed since the imposition of the restriction was a reasonable
and proper exercise of the police power of the state and since the consent
provision was not a delegation of legislation power but merely a permission
to modify the absolute terms of the act. Whitaker v. Green River Coal
Co. et al., 122 S. W. (2d) 1012 (Ky. 1938).
It is generally recognized that an exercise of the police power bearing
a substantial and reasonable relation to the public welfare is immune from
attack based on the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
though its incidental effect may be to deprive a citizen of his property.8
With this in view, perhaps the validity of the restriction imposed by the
statute involved in the instant case cannot be contested, yet the secondary
12. WILLIS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1936) 65o. But for an interesting discussion
of the nature of property rights and governmental interference with them, see Cohen,
Property and Sovereignty (1927) 13 CORN. L. Q. 8.
13. Baker v. Glenn, 2 F. Supp. 88o (E. D. Ky. 1933); Northern Cedar Co. v.
French, 131 Wash. 394, 23o Pac. 837 (1924).
14. Parlett Co-operative, Inc. v. Tidewater Lines, Inc., 164 Md. 405, 165 Atl. 313
(1933); North Shore Fish and Freight Co. v. North Shore Business Men's Trucking
Ass'n, 195 Minn. 336, 263 N. W. 98 (1935).
15. See Cadwallader, supra note 2, pp. 833-835. It should be noted that the
co-operatives exempted in the instant statute are those qualifying under the CapperVolstead Act. Such co-operatives are exempted, by implication, from the operation of
the Anti-Trust laws, but are subject to regulation by the Secretary of Agriculture under
the same enactment, 42 STAT. 388 (1922), 7 U. S. C. A. §§ 291, 292 (1927), hence the
objection to the tendency of co-operatives toward monopoly has already'been overcome
by the legislature.
I. Ky. STAT. (Baldwin's Carroll, 1936) § 2739-51.
2. The dissent indicates that, even in the absence of the consent provision, the statute may be invalidated by failing to prescribe any standard for determining when the
Chief of the Department of Mines may properly grant or withhold consent to its operation: instant case at 3017. See also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886).
3. See BLACK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1927) 423, and cases therein cited.
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problem of the constitutionality of the accompanying consent provision is
not thereby satisfactorily disposed of. The case of Cusack Co. v. Chicago,4
the sole authority cited by the instant court in support of its conclusion
as to the validity of the consent provision, 5 involved an ordinance prohibiting the erection of any billboard in a residential district without the
consent of a majority of the landowners on the block in which it was to
be erected. The Supreme Court of the United States, in its struggle to
uphold the ordinance as a reasonable exercise of the police power," dismissed the secondary problem with the somewhat cursory remark that if
the consent provision was absent the prohibition would be absolute, and
that, therefore, the complaining party could not be injured, but might in
fact be benefited, by the presence of the provision.7 This argument, in
its failure to reach any conclusion either as to the constitutionality of the
consent provision or as to whether the legislative body ever intended to
impose an absolute prohibition, would seem incomplete in the light of the
general rule that, where a provision of a statute is unconstitutional and
cannot be rejected without causing the statute to enact what the legislature
never intended, the whole statute must be adjudged invalid.8 Yet the
Cusack case is accepted by the instant court even in the face of the later
case of Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge,9 also decided by the United States Supreme Court, which led to the opposite
result, and in which the attempt to distinguish the Cusack case met with
somewhat questionable success. 10 The instant court, as well as others
upholding the validity of consent provisions,"- seems to have ignored the
fundamental question of whether the action of the legislature, be it regarded strictly as a delegation of power or not,1 2 conflicts with the Fourteenth Amendment in empowering an adjoining landowner, in his uncontrolled and arbitrary discretion, to restrict his neighbor in the use of his
4. 24 2 U. S. 526 (I9W7).
5. Instant case at 15.

6. See McBain, Law Making by Property Owners (1921) 36 PoL. Sc. Q. 617, in
regard to the difficulty in determining what legislation may properly be embraced by
the police power. The Cusack case is leading in the growing tendency to include legislation prompted by purely aesthetic considerations: Ingalls, The Law of Aesthetics
(1937) 23 A. B. A. J. igI.
7. 242 U. S. at 53o. The court distinguished Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U. S. 137
(1912), on the rather artificial ground that permission to waive a restriction by affirmative action is not a delegation of legislative power while permission to impose a restriction by affirmative action is. See (1932) 27 ILL. L. RrEV. 305.
8. See BLAcK, op. cit. supra note 3, at 76. See McBain, mpra note 6, at 634, for
further criticism.
9. 278 U. S. 116 (1928). The ordinance here provided that a philanthropic home
for old people would be permitted when the consent of the owners of two-thirds of the
property within four hundred feet was obtained. The instant court distinguished this
case apparently on the uncertain ground that the decision was based on an improper
exercise of the police power even in the absence of a consent provision: instant case at
10I5.
10. 278 U. S. at 122. The attempted distinction confuses the question of delegation
of power with the question of proper exercise of the police power in the first place. See
Note (93)
5 U. OF CIN. L. Rxv. 197, in which the attempt to reconcile the two cases
by resort to the Hohfeldian system of analysis led to a superficial rather than a substantial distinction. See also (1929) 13 MiNN. L. REV. 507.
Ix. Weeks v. Heurich, 4o App. D. C. 46 (1913) ; Myers v. Fortunato, 1io Atl. 847
(Del. 192o) ; Chicago v. Stratton, 162 Iil. 494, 44 N. E. 853 (1896) ; People ex rel.
Busching v. Ericsson, 263 II. 368, IO5 N. E. 315 (1914) ; Shepard v. Seattle, 59 Wash.

363, io9 Pac. lO67 (igio).
12. While the questions of delegation of legislative power and application of the,

Fourteenth Amendment are closely related, a decision that there has been no delegation of power in a particular case would not seem to require the conclusion that there
has been no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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property. It is true that the operation of a law may properly be made to
depend on a future contingency, 3 but this appears to refer to a contingency
of fact, rather than of judgment and will of persons outside the constitutional lawmaking body 1 4 which would seem to jeopardize the assurance
of due process and equal protection of the laws.' 5

Corporations-Consolidations-Right of a Constituent Creditor to
Claim a Preference upon the Insolvency of the Consolidated Corporation-A Michigan insurance company underwrote fidelity bonds for
appellant bank. While a suit on the bonds was pending, the company
entered into an agreement of consolidation with a Pennsylvania and a
New York company, the consolidated company, incorporated in New
York, expressly assuming the obligations and liabilities of the three original companies. Upon the insolvency of the consolidated corporation a
receiver was appointed in Michigan and a liquidator in New York. Subsequently the pending suit was concluded in favor of the appellant and
proof of claim was filed in the Michigan receivership proceedings. Over
the objection of the appellant, an agreement was authorized between the
receiver and the liquidator for the transfer of Michigan assets to New
York upon condition that claims approved by Michigan courts be entitled
to the same rate of distribution as New York claims. Held (two judges
dissenting), that since the claim arose before consolidation, the consolidated
corporation held the assets of the constituent subject to the rights of constituent creditors, and that it was an abuse of discretion to order the
transfer without first ascertaining that Michigan creditors would receive
adequate protection in the foreign jurisdiction. Commissioner of Insurance v. Lloyds Insurance Co. of America, 283 N. W. 703 (Mich. 1939).

Where an insolvent corporation possesses assets in a foreign jurisdiction, it is entirely within the discretion of that jurisdiction to determine
whether the assets shall be remitted to the primary jurisdiction for distribution or whether they shall be distributed locally in the ancillary proceeding.' Tom between the recognized advantages of a centralized administration 2 and a tender regard for local creditors," courts frequently
release assets upon specific conditions 4 designed to protect the interests
of the local creditors. Although the instant court did not stipulate the
conditions that it would require,5 by deciding that provisions which in13. See BLACK, op. cit. supra note 3, at 355, and cases therein cited.

14. See McBain, supra note 6, at 64o.

15. The following cases are among those holding ordinances void on the ground

that the provision for the consent of adjoining landowners is an unconstitutional delegation of authority: Tilford v. Belknap, 126 Ky. 244, 103 S. W. 289 (19o7) ; McCown
v. Gose, 244 Ky. 402, 51 S. W. (2d) 251 (1932)

(relied on by the dissent and, appar-

ently unsuccessfully, distinguished by the majority in the instant case) ; St. Louis v.

Russell, 116 Mo. 248, 22 S. W. 470 (1893) ; State v. Withnell, 78 Neb. 33, 1io N. W.
68o (1907).

i. Note

82 U. OF PA. L. Rrv. 848, 854.
35 COL. L. REv. 604.
3. See Laughlin, The ExtraterritorialPowers of Receivers (1932) 45
2.

(1934)

(1935)

HARv. L.

REv. 429, 444.

4. Note (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 757, 759 et seq.
5. Mr. Justice Potter, in a concurring opinion supported by four of the five justices
agreeing with the majority opinion, implied that, under no circumstances should Michigan assets be allowed to leave the jurisdiction, but that they should be retained and
administered for the benefit of Michigan creditors. The import of the opinion is not
entirely clear. However, if Mr. Justice Potter meant that the policy of the state was
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sured an equal distribution in the primary jurisdiction and which allowed
local proof were inadequate,6 it indicated that the appellant occupied a
more favorable position than that of a general unsecured creditor of the
consolidated corporation. That general creditors of a constituent are entitled to a like status against the consolidation is expressly provided by
statute.7 In addition, however, a local statute preserved the constituent
for the purpose of suits pending against it at the time of consolidation."
Thus the appellant occupied two roles: that of a general creditor of the
consolidation and that of a judgment creditor of the constituent,9 and
although normally it would be to the advantage of a creditor to select the
former status, 10 in the instant situation it appeared that constituent creditors would recover a greater dividend if paid off as such out of constituent
assets." ' Inasmuch as the creditor of a constituent can usually claim a
preference as against the constituent's property in the hands of the consolidated corporation,' 2 the real issue appears to concern the effect of the
appellant's filing in the insolvency proceedings of the consolidated corporation. The majority opinion did not discuss this problem, but the dissenting opinion contended that the appellant, by so doing, waived its right to
claim as a creditor of the constituent. It is submitted, however, that a
mere manifestation of intention to pursue one remedy should not operate
to bar any other remedy open to the creditor.' 3 Since the very purpose
of a consolidation is to strengthen the position of weaker constituents with
respect to claims against them, a constituent creditor should be allowed to
to exclude all foreign creditors until Michigan creditors had been paid in full, that policy would appear to be clearly unconstitutional as in contravention to the privileges and
immunities clause of the United States Constitution. See Mulder and Solomon, Effect
of the Chandler Act on General Assignments and Compositions (1939) 87 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 763, 778. See also Note (1939) 87 U. OF PA. L. REv. 328, 329 et seq.
6. A possible interpretation of the majority opinion, though highly improbable in
view of the number of justices supporting the concurring opinion, might be that it felt
that there was insufficient evidence on the record to enable it to exercise its discretion.
Thus, if it subsequently developed that there was such a preponderance of assets in New
York that the appellant would receive a larger dividend than if it were restricted to the
assets of the constituent in Michigan, the court might release upon the conditions
authorized by the lower court. On the other hand, if it developed that there would be
a greater return to Michigan creditors if they were allowed to proceed, together with
any foreign creditor who filed in Michigan, solely against the Michigan assets, those
assets would be retained. In the latter case, even though no technical preferences were
allowed to Michigan creditors, nevertheless the inconveniences of distance would operate
to diminish the number of non-resident creditors filing in the ancillary jurisdiction.
7. MICH. ACTs (1931) No. 327, § 53. "- . . Provided, That all rights of creditors and all liens upon the property of any of said constituent corporations of this state
shall be preserved unimpaired, and all debts, liabilities and duties of the respective constituent corporations shall thenceforth attach to said resulting corporation, and may be
enforced against it to the same extent as if said debts, liabilities and duties had been
incurred or contracted by it."
8. Micir. ACTs (1931) No. 327, § 55. "Any action or proceeding pending by or
against any of the corporations of this state which shall be consolidated or merged may
be prosecuted to judgment, as if such consolidation or merger had not taken place. .. ."
9. It would seem that appellant might have insured a preference by attaching property of the constituent upon the initiation of its suit against the constituent. By so
doing it would have become a lien creditor upon judgment.
IO. Because of the theoretically larger amount of corporate assets against which it
might proceed to enforce its claim. See Note (1935) 45 YALE L. J. 105, 126.
II. Instant case at 709.
12. GLENN, CREDITOR'S RIGHTS AND RasamnEs (1915) § 126; 8 THompsoN, CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1927) § 6o51. This, however, is not a universal rule. 15 FLETcHER,
COR'ORATIONS (Perm. ed.) § 7104. See Note (1932) 30 MIcir. L. REV. 1074, 1076.
13. See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 381, comment b. Cf. RESTATEMENT,
AGENCY (1933) § 337, comment a.
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pursue both courses until it can determine which will better subserve its
interests.1 4
Negligence-Duty Owed Seen Trespasser by LandownerPlaintiff while driving his truck along a wet road attempted to avoid
hitting another car and as a result skidded off the highway onto defendant's tracks. Plaintiff was unable to extricate himself. A trolley car
approached at a speed of about twenty miles an hour and when about
one hundred feet away from the truck the motorman abandoned the controls and ran to the back of the car which struck the truck and seriously
injured plaintiff. Held, assuming that plaintiff was a trespasser the defendant is liable for the motorman's culpable negligence. Kennedy v.
Southern Penna. Traction Co., 3 Atl. (2d) 395 (Pa. 1939).
The majority view with relation to the duty of care owed a trespasser
observed by the landowner is that the latter will be liable "for failure to
carry on his activities upon the land with reasonable care for the trespasser's safety".' Seemingly opposed to this is the view that the land-2
owner is liable to adult trespassers only for "wilful or wanton" conduct.
However even where these vague and misleading terms are used the result
reached quite frequently is to hold the landowner liable for failure to
exercise ordinary care.' This seems to be especially true upon an analysis
of cases involving child trespassers in Pennsylvania. 4 In fact one jurisdiction has gone so far as to adopt the majority rule in relation to child
trespassers and the minority rule in relation to adult trespassers. 5 That
there is a fallacious distinction between the terms used by the courts, i. e.,
wilfull and wanton, and the results obtained in the cases were recoguized in
a recent review of the Pennsylvania law on this subject where it was
argued that the court should frankly admit what it is doing and indicate
that ordinary negligence is sufficient to create liability in this type of case.6
With the advent of this case it would seem that Pennsylvania law has
fallen in line with this view. Under the facts of the case it appears that
the motorman became frightened and left the controls of the car through
sheer panic, but that there was no reckless disregard for the safety of
others amounting to "wilfull and wanton" conduct. In view of this factual
14. Such reasoning finds analogous situations in other fields of the law. Thus, a
mortgagee may implead his mortgagor and an assuming grantee in a foreclosure proceeding and, upon a deficiency, docket judgments against both. See Robson v. O'Toole,
45 Cal. App. 63, 187 Pac. IiO (1919). Cf. Ross v. Warren, 196 Iowa 659, I95 N. W.
228 (1923). 2 WILusToN, CONTRACTS (Rev'd ed. 1936) §§384, 385; CLARK, CODE
PLEADING (1928) §76.
i. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934)

§ 336; HARPER, TORTS (933)

§ 89.

2. Goodrich, Landozmrer's Liability (1922) 7 IOwA L. BULL. 65, 70; Peaslee, Duty
to Seen Trespassers (1914) 27 HARV. L. REv. 403; Note (1921) 30 YALE L. J. 201. See

also Magar v. Hammond, 183 N. Y. 387, 76 N. E. 474 (19o6) ; Note (1927) 49 A. L.
R. 799.
3. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 336, special note; HARPER, TORTS (1933)

§ 89-

"a failure to exercise 'reasonable and proper care' after the discovery of a trespasser in
a perilous position amounts to 'reckless' or 'wanton' misconduct. . . ." Some courts
frankly admit what they are doing, see Burden, Smith & Co. v. McMillan, 35 Ga. App.
639, 134 S. E. 189 (1926), where in a syllabus by the court it is said that ".

.

. fail-

ure to exercise ordinary care after peril is apparent may be by wantonness."
4. See Eldredge, Tort Liability to Trespassers (1937) 12 TEMPLE L. Q. 32, 39.
5. Buckeye Ins. Co. v. Askren, 45 Ariz. 566, 46 P. (2d) io68 (935).
But see
HARPER, TORTS (1933)

§94.

6. Eldredge, supra note 4, at 43.
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situation and the citation of cases 7 where child trespassers were involved
and where the result has been to hold the landowner liable for "ordinary
negligence" the case indicates that this is now sufficient in the case of adult
trespassers. However, the choice by the court of the term "culpable" was
unfortunate due to the vagueness and indefiniteness of this word. Nevertheless the case is at least a step forward to the day when the court will
frankly say that ordinary negligence is sufficient to create liability in this
type of case.
Taxation-Allocation of Income Tax on "Alimony Trust" After
the °Death of the Husband-Settlor-Prior to their divorce, taxpayer
and husband entered into a contract for the settlement of their marital rights
in which she agreed to relinquish all claims for future support and all rights
of dower and property, and he agreed, inter alia, to create one trust of
$2oo,ooo in her favor immediately, and another of $ioo,ooo within five
years. After the first was created, husband died, and his administrator
created the second as part of a compromise agreement with the wife. 1 Held,
the income from both trusts is taxable to the wife and not to the husband's
estate. Thomas v. Commissioner, ioo F. (2d) 408 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
The court reached its result on the practical grounds that it would
be impossible to determine how much of the income could be allocated to
alimony and how much to dower, 2 and that it would be difficult to subject
the husband's estate to such a continuing administrative burden. Apparently confused by their discussion of similar cases involving the situation
where the husband was still alive,3 the court appears to have overlooked
a clear line of reasoning. The income from a trust set up for the wife in
lieu of alimony is taxable to the husband because he is discharging a legal
obligation 4 but even if it be admitted that a trust set up only in lieu of
dower might be taxable to the husband when he is alive,5 after his death
certainly such a trust is taxable to the wife. 6 Since the husband's obligation
to pay alimony ceases with his death,7 it seems clear that no obligation
7. Instant case at 398. Prior to this case most of the Pennsylvania cases permitting trespassers to recover have dealt with child trespassers. Eldredge, Mipra note 4.
i. The agreement provided further that the husband was to pay certain sums, and
assign income from trusts in his favor. As he died before he could do this, his admintrator and the wife made a compromise agreement. The court further held that the
wife was not entitled to a bad debt deduction as a result of this compromise.
2. It should be noted that part of the husband's obligation under the agreement was
to pay certain sums to the wife annually for the duration of their joint lives. If the
courts had so desired, they might have allocated these sums to alimony and considered
the remainder of the payments as dower.
3. For a discussion of the general problem of taxation of the alimony and dower
trust, see Note, 87 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 337 (1939).
4. Douglas v. Wilcuts, 296 U. S. i (935).
5. There has been no direct holding that a trust set up in lieu of dower is taxable
to the husband. In most of the cases, dower and alimony have been so intermingled in
the same trust, that the courts have refused to attempt to separate them. See Douglas
v. Wilcuts, 296 U. S. 1 (1935); Helvering v. Brooks, 82 F. (2d) 173 (C. C. A. 2d,
1936). The Board of Tax Appeals has indicated its willingness on the presentation of
proper evidence, to segregate them. Thorne Donnelley, 37 B. T. A., Jan. 14, 1938. But
cf. Frank T. Hogan, 35 B. T. A. 26 (1936).
6. Helvering v. Butterworth, 29o U. S. 365 (1933).
7. The Second Circuit had already held that as the obligation to pay alimony ceases
when the wife remarries, the income from a trust set up for her benefit is not taxable to
him in such event. Commissioner v. Blumenthal, 91 F. (2d) OO9 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937),
aflrining, 34 B. T. A. 994 (936). Contra: Alsop v. Commissioner, 92 F. (2d) 148
(C. C. A. 3d, 1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 767 (1938).
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remains on his estate which income from the trust is used to discharge.
Therefore it should be taxed not to the estate but to the wife. Judge
Learned Hand's fear that the result reached would be unfair to the wife
since she had accepted a lesser amount of income in consideration that she
would not have to pay any tax on it, can be allayed in the instant case at
least by pointing out that at the time this trust was created the income was,
in fact, taxable to her and not to the husband."
Taxation-Applicability of Federal Estate Tax to Joint Tenancies
Created prior to the Act-A husband and wife created a joint tenancy before the effective date of any taxing Act, the wife's contribution
being property previously given to her without consideration by her husband. The Revenue Act of 19261 provided for the taxation of "the interest . . . (in property) held as joint tenants by the decedent and any
other person . . . except such part thereof as may be shown to have
originally belonged to such other person and never to have been received
or acquired by the latter from the decedent for less than a fair consideration in money or money's worth . . .".
This Act also contained a2
proviso that it should apply to joint tenancies created before its enactment.
At the husband's death in 193o, a tax on the full value of the tenancy was
imposed. The surviving spouse contends that a tax on the full value of
the tenancy is unconstitutionally retroactive since it taxes property which
had vested in her on the creation of the tenancy. Held (Justices McReynolds, Butler and Roberts dissenting), that (i) the Revenue Act
clearly applies to joint tenancies created before its enactment,3 and (2)
such application is constitutional because there was at death a distinct
shifting of economic benefit derived from the entire joint tenancy which
Congress can measure by the full value of the property. Dimock v.
Corwin, 6 U. S. L. Week 879 (Sup. Ct. 1939). See also United States v.
Jacobs, 6 U. S. L. Week 877 (Sup. Ct. 1939).4
That the Federal Estate Tax may be levied on the full value of a
tenancy by the entirety created after the Act at the death of the sole contributing tenant was decided in Tyler v. United States.' The theory of
that case seems to be that looking at the transfer as a whole, the entire
property has passed from the husband to the wife and that since death is
the generating source placing the full rights to the property in the wife,
the entire transfer is sufficiently related to death to be taxable by a death
tax. 6 Moreover, under the statute the same result would obtain even if
the wife contributed to the tenancy property which had previously been
given to her without consideration by her husband.7 It has also been

8. Douglas v. Wilcuts, 296 U. S. i, which was the first case to hold the trust income taxable to the husband, was decided in 1935, while the trusts in the instant case
were set up in 1924 and 193o. The Treasury Department had ruled in accord with the
instant case on the grounds that no further obligation exists. Cum. BULL. 1937-I.
p. I17.
1.
2.

48

STAT. 752 (1934),

Id. at § (h).

26 U. S. C. A. §411 (1935).

3. See Schwab v. Doyle, 258 U. S. 529, 535 (1922), and Knox v. McElligott, 258
U. S. 546, 549 (1922), holding that the Act of 1916 containing no retroactive provision
did not apply to tenancies created before 1916.
4. That case also involved a joint tenancy created before 1916, but there the decedent was the sole contributor.
5. 281 U. S. 497 (1930).
6. Id. at 503.
7. See portion of statute quoted sui'ra.
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decided per curiam that the result is not to be affected by the fact that the
tenancy by the entirety was created prior to the enactment of the taxing
statute.8 However, it was argued that the incidents of a joint tenancy
differ from those of a tenancy by the entirety in that a joint tenant's
interest before the death of the other tenant is severable and subject to
sale.9 Thus, the interest of each tenant in one-half of the tenancy becomes
vested at the creation of the tenancy. Under this theory, it is manifest
that there is sufficient vesting of a property interest to render the tax
unconstitutionally retroactive on the authority of Coolidge v. Long.10
However, the majority opinion hurdles the doctrine of that case by declaring the distinction between tenancies by the entirety and joint tenancies
to be no more than an outmoded common law fiction. The majority finds
justification for the imposition of a death tax on the full value of the
tenancy in the theory that looking at the relationship as of the time of
death, there is a ripening of the right to a complete fee in the survivor
derived from the extinction of all rights to the fee in the other tenant.
Thus, at death, there is a taxable event which can reasonably be measured
by the full value of the joint estate. While this change of emphasis to
the time of death does not disregard the circumstances of the creation of
the tenancy, it is clear that the fact that the tenancy was created prior to
the taxing act will not be determinative in considering whether the tax is
unconstitutionally retroactive. It also seems clear that the question of
whether or not there was a vesting of a property interest prior to death
will have no bearing on that question. Thus, Coolidge v. Long, already
on shaky foundation,"- is further weakened by the result of this case.
Teachers' Tenure Act-Permanent Supply Teacher as Professional Employee-The relator, a duly qualified music teacher, was
selected by the school board on October 29, 1937, as a "supply teacher"
to fill a permanent vacancy for the remainder of the school term. Despite
repeated requests, relator was never given a written contract although she
performed all of her duties and there were no charges against her. The
school board released her as a "substitute teacher" at the end of the term.
Mandamus was sought to compel the board to recognize her as a "professional employee" under the Teachers' Tenure Act ' and to grant her a
written contract. Held, mandamus issued. Commonwealth ex rel. Hetrick
'v. School District of the City of Sunbury, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Feb.
24, 1939, p. I, col. 2 (Pa. C. P. 1939).
2
After the constitutionality of Teachers' Tenure Laws was upheld,
many school boards which had thus been deprived of their discretionary
8. Third Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. White, 287 U. S. 577

Bowers, 303 U. S. 618 (1938).

(1932);

Helvering v.

9. See Jacobs case at 878.

Coolidge v. Long held that when a life estate in a hus10. 282 U. S. 582 (1931).
band with remainder over in children was created by a wife before the effective date
of an amendment to the Federal Estate Tax specifically taxing such interest it was an
unconstitutional retroactive tax, the reason being that the remainder was vested before
the effective date of the Act.
ii. See Binney v. Long, 299 U. S. 285 (x936).

i. PA. STAT. ANx. (Purdon, Supp. 1938) tit 24, § 12i et seq.
2. Grigsby v. King, 2o2 Cal. 299, 26o Pac. 789 (1927) ; Morris v. Board of Education, i19 Cal. App. 750, 7 P. (2d) 364 (1932) ; Elwood v. State, 203 Ind. 626, i8o N. E.
471 (1932) ; Nyberg v. School Directors, I9o Wis. 570, 209 N. W. 683 (1926). The
Pennsylvania Teachers' Tenure Act of 1937 was upheld in the Teachers' Tenure Act

Cases, 329 Pa. 213, 197 Atl. 344 (1938).
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power to dismiss employees without cause resorted to various coercive
measures to prevent the practical enforcement of such acts and to retain
some measures of control over the teaching staffs. Among the devices
used have been reductions in salary, 3 demotion, 4 requiring a teacher to
work in a school where her health would be endangered, 5 and requiring
twelve months duty at no extra compensation instead of the usual ten
months term.6 Apparently the most common practice adopted by school
boards is, however, a refusal to grant permanent status so as to bring the
teacher within the protection of the Acts.7 The instant case represents a
more or less admitted attempt to circumvent the legislative intent in this
way. The board contended that a "supply teacher" was not a "professional
employee" within the meaning of the Act, that it had never entered into
a contract with the relator and, having rescinded her selection, she was
not entitled to a contract." Courts have generally refused to sanction any
of these evasive measures and, it is submitted that the court in the instant
case properly decided that the board, having failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of the Act prescribing a written contract, could not be
permitted to defend on the basis of its own violation of the statute. The
Pennsylvania Act, unlike others,9 provides no probationary period for
teachers, 10 and since the relator was duly qualified and had performed
her duties as a full-time teacher for the term she could not be considered
merely a temporary substitute. The court thus held that a permanent
"supply teacher" is a "professional employee" within the Act. Any other
decision would defeat the purpose of the Teachers' Tenure Law."
3. Chambers v. Davis, 131 Cal. App. 500, 22 P. (2d) 27 (1933) ; Abraham v. Sims,
2 Cal. (2d) 698, 42 P. (2d) 1029 (1935) ; Hutton v. Gill, 212 Ind. 164, 8 N. E. (2d)
818 (1937).
4. Gastineau v. Meyer, 131 Cal. App. 61I, 22 P. (2d) 31 (1933); cf. Swick v.

Board of School Directors, 329 Pa. 238, 197 Atl. 358 (1938).
5. Dutart v. Woodward, 99 Cal. App. 736, 279 Pac. 493 (1929).
6. Malone v. Hayden, 329 Pa. 235, 197 Atl. 357 (1938). See, in addition, Dutart v.
Woodward, 99 Cal. App. 736, 279 Pac. 493 (1929) (refusal to assign work would be
improper) ; Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 5 Cal. App. (2d) 64, 42 P. (2d) 397 (1935)

(assigning work for which the teacher was unqualified would be improper). As to the
dismissal of a woman teacher because of marriage compare McQuaid v. State, 211 Ind.
595, 6 N. E. (2d) 547 (1937) with Elwood v. State, 2o3 Ind. 626, i8o N. E. 471 (1932),
and Hutton v. Gill, 212 Ind. 164, 8 N. E. (2d) 818 (1937). See also Dutart v. Woodward, 99 Cal. App. 736, 279 Pac. 493 (1929) ; Thomas v. Dalton Borough School District, Pa. C. P. Sept. Term, 1937, No. 1834.

7. La Shells v. Hench, 98 Cal. App. 6, 276 Pac. 377 (1929) ; Briney v. Santa Ana
High School District, 131 Cal. App. 357, 21 P. (2d) 61o 0933) ; Mitchell v. Board of
Trustees, 5 Cal. App. (2d) 64, 42 P. (2d) 397 (1935) ; Nyberg v. School Directors,
190 Wis. 570, 209 N. W. 683 (1926).
8. Cf. Hawkins' Petition, 129 Pa. Super. 453, 195 Atl. 761 (1938).
9. CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, Supp. 1935) Act 7519, § 5.500-5.712; IND. STAT.
AxN. (Baldwin, 1934) § 6oo3; i N. J. Rav. STAT. (937) tit. 18, c. 13, § 16; N. Y.
CONSOL. LAws (Cahill, Supp. 1938) c. 15, § 561, 872; 5 ORF. CODE ANN. (Supp. 1935)
tit 35, C. 26, §§ 2616, 2618.
1O. The Edmonds Bill is now before the Pennsylvania Legislature under which the
Teachers' Tenure Act would be amended to provide a one year probationary period, to
add as causes for dismissal insubordination or conduct unbecoming a professional employee, and would make it optional with the school boards to retain or dismiss married
women teachers. This last change has been withdrawn recently.
Ii. "The purpose of the Act is to preserve the system of employment in the educational field free from any interference, and by that action it takes away the heretofore
discretionary power of school boards to oust employees without cause." Chief Justice
Kephart in Teachers' Tenure Act Cases, 329 Pa. 213, 222, 197 Atl. 344, 351 (1938).
"The Teachers' Tenure Act was designed to secure to the citizens of Pennsylvania
a competent and efficient school system by preventing dismissal of capable teachers
without just cause." Id. at 231, 197 Atl. 344, 355 (1938).
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Usury-Right of Subsequent Mortgagee to Raise Question of
Usury in Prior Mortgage Transaction-Plaintiffs, beneficiary and
trustee under junior mortgage or deed of trust, desiring to be subrogated
to the rights of senior mortgagees, seek an injunction restraining foreclosure under the senior mortgage pending ascertainment of the amount
legally due thereon. It is alleged that the loan secured by this mortgage
called for usurious interest and that, thereby, all interest was forfeited.
From decree granting injunction the senior mortgagees appeal. Held,
decree affirmed, but plaintiffs, having no greater right than the mortgagor,
will be permitted only to purge the debt of its usurious excess.1 Pinnix
et al. v. Maryland Casualty Co. et al., 200 S. E. 874 (N. C. 1939).
The instant court, although reaching a seemingly desirable result,
failed to rebut satisfactorily the argument that the junior mortgagee should
not be permitted to raise the usury question even to the extent of the
usurious excess. The oft-quoted dogma, that the usury statutes, being
for the protection of borrowers against the oppressive exactions of lenders,
should provide relief only to the debtor and his privies, 2 seems to be the
basis on which many courts have decided adversely to the junior mortgagee,8 arguing in effect that as to so much of the property as is necessary4
to satisfy the prior lien he is not in privity of estate with the debtor.
These courts are also influenced by the thought that since the junior
mortgagee voluntarily accepted as security the property already pledged
for a specified amount he cannot in good faith attempt to reduce such
amount for the purpose of increasing the value of his security.5 However,
the above dogma appears to have been more generally invoked in the case
of a grantee of property subject to a mortgage who has withheld from
the purchase price an amount sufficient to cover the incumbrance. 6 It is
fairly obvious that the grantee under such circumstances is not injured by
denial of the right to raise the usury question, but the applicability of the
same rule to the instant situation does not seem so clear. It is fundamental that the junior mortgagee has the right to redeem a senior mortgage for the protection of his security,7 becoming subrogated to the rights
of the senior mortgagee against the mortgagor. The manifest injustice
of allowing the senior mortgagee to profit by his statutory violation at the
I. The court was more actively concerned with the abatement of an unsound discrimination against the mortgagor and in favor of the junior mortgagee, as evidenced
by the previous case of Broadhurst v. Brooks, 184 N. C. 123, 113 S. E. 576 (I922),
here overruled to the extent that it allowed the junior mortgagee to secure a forfeiture
of all interest, when the mortgagor is required to make tender of the principal amount
due plus legal interest before he can raise the usury question. In this connection see
(1934) 12 N. C. L. REv. 279 (dealing with the interpretation of the controlling statute),

and (1935) 14 N. C. L. REv. ii4. While plaintiffs in the instant case, having proceeded in good faith on the rule of the Broadhurst case, were not required to make
tender, the court stipulated that hereafter the junior mortgagee must make tender of,
or at least offer to pay, the principal and legal interest' as a condition precedent to
equitable relief. Instant case at 88o.
2. See 27 R. C. L. 281, quoted in Stuart Court Realty Corp. v. Gillespie, i5o Va.
515, 529, 143 S. E. 741, 745 (1928) ; instant case at 879; Note (i929) 59 A. L. R. 342.
See also WEBB, UsuRY (1899) § 363 et seq. But see Peoples Bank v. Loven, 172 N. C.
666, 9o S. E. 948 (igi6).
3. Stickney v. Moore, io8 Ala. 590, i9 So. 76 (1895) ; First State Bank v. Niklosson, 1i6 Neb. 713, 218 N. W. 744 (1928); Christian v. Worshan, 78 Va. Ioo (1883);
Ready v. Huebner, 46 Wis. 692, 1 N. W. 344 (1879). See 2 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. igi8) i986.
4. See Note (1933) 67 U. S. L. Rav. 163.
S. See Prichett v. Mitchell, 17 Kan. 355, 359 (1876).
6. See Note (1933) 67 U. S. L. REv. 163, 165, and cases cited therein.
7. See 2 WILTSIE, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE (4th ed. 1927) §§ 1120, 1148.
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expense of the junior mortgagee who, on payment of the usurious amount,
is subjected to the valid defense of the mortgagor,8 makes untenable the
position that the policy 1 behind the usury statutes was to provide a defense purely personal to the debtor, at least where it results in injury to
another. 10 The instant court, in allowing the junior mortgagee a right
co-extensive
with that of the mortgagor, seems to accord with better
1
reason. "

8. On payment of the senior claim the junior mortgagee becomes, in effect, the
assignee of the rights of the senior mortgagee against the mortgagor, in addition being
subject to any defenses the mortgagor may have had against the senior mortgagee. It
is conceivable, however, that the mortgagor might, under some circumstances, be
estopped from raising the defense of usury against the junior mortgagee as assignee of
the senior claim. If such were the situation, it would appear that the usury statutes
failed in their purpose of protecting the debtor.
9. See McConlogue, Usury (1928) 1 So. CALrw. L. REv. 253, for a discussion of the
influence of changing views as to the morality of usury on legislative policy. See also
(1926) 26 CoL L. Ray. io42. Commendable factual pictures of changing legislation in
connection with the small loan business are presented in GALLERT, Hs oaN AND MAY,
SMALL LOAN LEGISLATION (1932), and in RoBINsON AND NUGENT, REGULATION OF THE
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